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  SUPLEMENTO DE SEGUROS Y REASEGUROS 

DOCTRINA

 
     
 

Disclosure of Allegations and Moral Hazards in English reinsurances
Brotherton and Others v Aseguradora Colseguros S.A. & La Previsora SA

 

Por Alan Weir (*) 

 

The London market provides considerable reinsurance capacity for Latin American risks.  However, the reinsurances in question, particularly if arranged on a facultative basis, will often be governed by English law.  The impact of that is best considered before the policy is concluded.  Perhaps nowhere is that more true than when considering the disclosure which must be given by the insurer in order to comply with the English duty of utmost good faith.  This article seeks to illustrate some of the pitfalls this can hold, in the light of a recently decided English case.

 

In 1997 a bank in Columbia purchased Bankers’ blanket bond and professional indemnity insurances from two local insurance companies.  At the time, the Bank and some of the employees of the insurers knew that accusations of fraud were being made in the local press about the Bank.  The Bank’s view and that of its president (who was personally the subject of certain of those allegations) must have been that these were ill-founded and the local insurers may have taken the same view.  The local insurers arranged back-to-back reinsurance in London but no disclosure was made to the English reinsurers about these allegations.  By the time the reinsurance contract was finalised, the local insurers in fact also knew (the judge found) that several criminal charges had been laid against the Bank president and that he had been suspended.  The insurers’ London brokers certainly appear to have known about this but do not appear to have disclosed it either. 

 

In due course these charges were dismissed.  Nevertheless, claims were made on the insurance and those led to claims on the reinsurance.  At this point, the London reinsurers investigated and found out about the situation which had existed when they had been asked to reinsure.  They asserted that these allegations and charges were material circumstances which ought to have been disclosed.  If these had been disclosed, they said they would not have accepted the reinsurance.  Therefore they refused to pay the claims, elected to avoid the reinsurance policy (“recision”) and sued the insurer for a judicial declaration that this was the correct outcome.  The dispute has now been resolved in the reinsurers’ favour.  The points which may be worth noting from this unhappy tale are these.

 

Firstly, since the criminal charges were in fact dismissed, why did the English Court of Appeal consider they should have been disclosed?  This is perhaps the most important point in the case as it resolves an issue which has caused considerable differences between English judges in the past.  The legal analysis adopted by the Court of Appeal was that the duty to disclose is not confined to “facts” in the sense of matters which are certain.  An insurance or reinsurance buyer must disclose “circumstances” which it knows.  In past cases, “circumstances” have been held to include uncorroborated reports (for example from other owners about a ship which might be the one an owner is seeking to insure) and “intelligence.”  All that is excluded is gossip and rumour – and deciding what those are is not easy. 

 

Here the circumstance which was being considered was a detailed series of accusations.  If that was objectively material to reinsurers in this class of business, it ought to be disclosed so they could form their own view of it.  Moreover the result of allowing evidence as to the actual truth of the allegations was, the Court of Appeal feared, a massive trial-within-a-trial in England, to determine whether in fact there had been any misconduct at the Bank.  This had consequences.  For the insurers, this view meant that the subsequent acquittal or dismissal of the charges would be irrelevant since, at the time the reinsurance was purchased, the local insurers could not have known the charges would be dismissed.  Therefore all evidence and argument about the later dismissal of the charges was excluded.  

 

In future cases, any insurer who finds itself in this situation should not be deciding (as may have happened here) that the allegations are ill-founded and therefore disclosure can be excused.  The safe course is to disclose the fact of the allegations and, if the insurer honestly thinks the allegations are ill-founded, explain why that is so to the reinsurer.  That may make broking the reinsurance harder or the reinsurance more costly, but that is preferable to having no cover.

 

Secondly, this case illustrates that the English concept of ‘moral hazard’ is not confined to insurance – it has a role in reinsurance cases also.  ‘Moral hazard’ is a phrase usually used to encompass heightened aspects of a risk brought about by the low moral character of an insurance buyer – his or her criminal record or his or her tendency to behave in a dishonest fashion.  Here, the moral hazard represented by the allegations of dishonesty against the Bank has led directly to the avoidance of the reinsurance.  Therefore, when arranging facultative reinsurance of this type, the best course must be to disclose fully what is known about any ‘moral hazard’ of the original insured (as well as any moral hazard of the insurer itself – a far less common consideration!)      

 

Thirdly, although in this case some of the claims do appear to have formed part of the case initially pursued by the Columbian authorities, it is worth emphasising that the remedy which English law grants to an insurer (or reinsurer) in this situation does not require the reinsurer to show that the circumstances it asserts were not disclosed in fact have any connection with the claim or claims which eventually arise on the policy.  The first question is whether the circumstances not disclosed were objectively material to underwriting the policy.  Here the Court had no difficulty concluding that allegations of dishonesty would be material to a fidelity policy.  The second question is whether the non-disclosure affected the actual underwriters’ approach to the risk.  Again, that point was decided in reinsurers’ favour.      

 

The moral of this tale is that care and caution in arranging reinsurances, especially in the current hard market, is a worthwhile investment.

 

 

(*) Alan Weir is a partner in Ince & Co’s Insurance and Reinsurance Group, specialising in coverage advice and reinsurance recoveries.